

Message Text

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SUBJECT: SECURITY ASSESSMENT REPORT

REFS: (A) STATE 82574 (B) DEPT A-1218

SUMMARY: FOLLOWING IS SECURITY ASSESSMENT REPORT FOR THE NETHERLANDS. COMMENTS ARE KEYED TO FORMAT CONTAINED REF B. IN OUR JUDGEMENT, BASED ON LIMITED EXPERTISE AND LIMITED DETAILED FIRST- HAND INFORMATION AT OUR DISPOSAL, SECURITY PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES IN THE NETHERLANDS CONTINUE TO BE ADEQUATE TO PROTECT UNITED STATES CLASSIFIED MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (CMI). WE RECOMMEND, HOWEVER, THAT NDPC CONDUCT ON- SITE SECURITY SURVEY IN 1974 TO UP- DATE LAST SURVEY REPORT PREPARED IN 1966. END SUMMARY

1. IA. A. 1-4. NO CHANGE FROM 1966 NDPC SURVEY REPORT, EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS. SINCE THE " POLITICAL SCENE " SECTION OF THE 1966 SURVEY REPORT WAS WRITTEN, THE NETHERLANDS HAS HAD THREE GENERAL ELECTIONS, AND THE ALIGNMENT OF POLITICAL FORCES HAS CHANGED CONSIDERABLY, EMBASSY REPORTS ON THE MOST RECENT ELECTION (NOVEMBER 1972) AND ON THE CURRENT GOVT ARE AVAILABLE IN WASHINGTON. SECTION III OF THE 1966 REPORT (LEGISLATION) SHOULD BE AMENDED AS FOLLOWS. IN MARCH 1970, THE GON ADOPTED A " REGULATION ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO ANTECEDENTS " WHICH
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REPLACED THE SO- CALLED " CIVIL SERVANTS BAN " OF 1954. THE NEW REGULATION PROVIDES INTER ALIA, ADDITIONAL FLEXIBILITY TO GON SECURITY OFFICIALS BY BROADENING (A) THE DEFINITION OF " CONFIDENTIAL FUNCTIONS " FOR WHICH SECURITY CLEARANCES ARE REQUIRED, AND

(B) THE GROUNDS ON WHICH SECURITY CLEARANCES CAN BE DENIED. A FULL TEXT OF THIS REGULATION IS BEING TRANSMITTED BY AIRGRAM. THE GON INTERNAL SECURITY SERVICE (BVD) CONSIDERS THE NEW REGULATION AS A VAST IMPROVEMENT OVER THE 1954 REGULATION. IN ADDITION, IN 1972, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE REORGANIZATION OF THE EXTERNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (IBD), A NEW REGULATION WENT INTO EFFECT PROVIDING FOR LIAISON WITH FRIENDLY (NATO) INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, AND EXHORTING GON INTELLIGENCE SERVICES AND OTHER GON ORGANS TO COOPERATE CLOSELY.

2. I. A. 5. AS FAR AS WE ARE AWARE, THE GON HAS SUFFICIENT CAPABILITY TO DETECT AND SUCCESSFULLY PROSECUTE VIOLATIONS OF SECURITY LAWS AND REGULATIONS. WE KNOW OF NO RECENT CASES OF SIGNIFICANT SECURITY VIOLATIONS.

3. I. B. THE THREAT. THE POTENTIAL THREAT TO CMI IS THREEFOLD: (A) PENETRATION OF THE GON AND DEFENSE INDUSTRY BY MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE NETHERLANDS (CPN), OR SUBORNATION OF GON/ DEFENSE INDUSTRY EMPLOYEES BY THE CPN OR BLOC EMBASSIES; (B) LEAKS GENERATED FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES BY GON/ INDUSTRY EMPLOYEES WHO ARE MEMBERS OF LEFT- WING PARTIES OR PACIFIST ORGANIZATIONS; (C) CARELESSNESS IN HANDLING CMI. WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE, HOWEVER, THAT ANY OF THESE POTENTIAL THREATS CONSTITUTES AN ACTUAL THREAT AT THE PRESENT TIME OR THAT IF SUCH POTENTIAL THREATS BECOME ACTUAL, THE GON WOULD NOT BE ABLE EFFECTIVELY TO DEAL WITH THEM.

4. I. C. PARAS 1 AND 2 OF SECTION IV (NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS FOR SECURITY) IN 1966 REPORT SHOULD BE AMENDED AS FOLLOWS. THE CHIEFS OF THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES DO NOT " REPORT" TO THE COORDINATOR OF THE INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SERVICES (CIVD), AS VARIOUS SERVICES ARE RESPONSIBLE TO INDIVIDUAL MINISTERS. PRIMARY FUNCTION OF COORDINATOR IS TO SERVE AS CHAIRMAN OF COMBINED INTELLIGENCE SERVICES COMMITTEE (CVIN) WHICH MEETS REGULARLY TO CONSULT ON QUESTIONS OF POLICY AND TO REVIEW AND DETERMINE INTELLIGENCE PRIORITIES. IN EVENT OF JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICT, ONE OF SECURITY OR INTELLIGENCE SERVICES INVOLVED CAN
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CALL UPON COORDINATOR TO DECIDE POINT AT ISSUE. OTHERWISE, COORDINATOR EXERCISES NO REAL CONTROL OVER ACTIVITIES OF INDIVIDUAL SERVICES. RE PAGE 11 OF 1966 REPORT, NDPC SHOULD BE AWARE THAT IBD UNDERWENT MAJOR REORGANIZATION IN 1970-71 DURING WHICH MOST OF TOP LEADERSHIP WAS CHANGED AND BUDGET AND PERSONNEL INCREASED. MISSION OF IBD REMAINED UNCHANGED, HOWEVER.

5. I. D. COOPERATION BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY AGENCIES IS VERY GOOD, AND SECURITY PROCEDURES OF DEFENSE INDUSTRY FIRMS APPEAR TO BE CLOSELY MONITORED BY MOD. I. E. GON SECURITY CLASSIFICATION CATEGORIES ARE EQUIVALENT TO THOSE OF USG.

6. II. A. PARAS 2-4 IN SECTION V(PERSONNEL SECURITY) OF

1966 REPORT SHOULD BE REPLACED BY FOLLOWING:

" UNDER THE REGULATIONS ADOPTED IN 1970 CONCERNING SECURITY CHECKS THE CLASSIFICATIONS " A", " B" AND " C" TO DESIGNATE THE LEVEL OF INVESTIGATION REQUIRED HAVE BEEN ELIMINATED. INSTEAD, THE TYPE OF INVESTIGATION MOUNTED IS DETERMINED IN CONSULTATION BETWEEN THE MINISTRY CONCERNED AND THE BVD. BECAUSE THE NEW PROCEDURE REQUIRES A SECURITY CHECK ONLY AFTER CRIMINAL CHECKS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED AND THE PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS OF THE INDIVIDUAL FOR A SPECIFIC POSTION HAVE BEEN DETERMINED, THE OVERALL NUMBER OF SECURITY CHECKS CONDUCTED HAS BEEN DRASTICALLY REDUCED. THE BVD OFFICIALS CONCERNED STATE THAT WITH THEIR REDUCED WORKLOAD THEY ARE NOW ABLE TO COMPLETE " A" CATEGORY TYPE CHECKS ON VIRTUALLY ALL MINISTRY REQUESTS. IT IS THEIR OPINION THAT THE PRESENT SYSTEM IS MUCH MORE EFFECTIVE THAN THE PREVIOUS SYSTEM WHEREBY THEY WERE INUNDATED WITH REQUESTS FOR SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS ON INDIVIDUALS ONLY A FEW OF WHOM EVER ACTUALLY TOOK GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT IN CLASSIFIED POSITIONS."

7. II. B. AND C. AS FAR AS WE ARE AWARE, PHYSICAL SECURITY FACILITIES AND PROCEDURES ARE ADEQUATE TO PROTECT CMI, BUT ONLY AN ON- SITE SURVEY BY NDPC EXPERTS COULD CONFIRM THIS JUDGEMENT. II. D. COVERED IN PARA 1 ABOVE. II. E. NO CHANGE FROM 1966 NDPC SECURITY SURVEY REPORT.

8. III. FINDINGS. RE PARA 3 OF SECTION IX (FINDINGS) OF 1966 REPORT, WE DOUBT THAT DUTCH NAVY CLEARANCE INVESTIGATION SECRET

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REQUIREMENTS ARE LESS STRINGENT THAN THOSE OF OTHER DUTCH MILITARY SERVICES. IT IS OUR IMPRESSION THAT ANNUAL INSPECTION BY US NUCLEAR CERTIFICATION TEAM HAS RESULTED IN IMPROVED PROCEDURES BY RNLN. PARA 6 OF FINDINGS SECTION SHOULD BE REPLACED BY FOLLOWING: " THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT HAS AN ADEQUATE LEGAL BASIS FOR ITS SECURITY PROGRAM.

ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO " OFFICIAL SECRET' S ACT" AS SUCH, THE CRIMINAL CODE, WHICH GOVERNS THE CONDUCT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, PROVIDES PENAL SANCTIONS TO ENFORCE THE PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION."

9. IV. CONCLUSIONS. WE HAVE NO REASON TO CHALLENGE OR CHANGE JUDGMENT REACHED IN 1966 BY NDPC SECURITY SURVEY TEAM THAT: " THE GOVERNMENT OF THE NETHERLANDS HAS IN OPERATION A SECURITY PROGRAM WHICH APPEARS TO BE PROVIDING ADEQUATE PROTECTION FOR CLASSIFIED U. S. MILITARY INFORMATION, INCLUDING THAT TRANSMITTED PURSUANT TO SECTIONS 91(C) AND 144(B) OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954 AS AMENDED." WE WOULD LIKE TO NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE SHORTLY AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR, THERE IS A LABOR PARTY PRIME MINISTER AND LABOR PARTY MINISTERS OF DEFENSE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS. THE THREE INDIVIDUALS CONCERNED ARE ALL

MODERATE AND RESPONSIBLE MEN AND WE HAVE NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THEY WILL MAKE ANY CHANGES THAT WILL AFFECT THE PROTECTION OF CMI. THE LEFT WING OF THE LABOR PARTY, AND THE TWO OTHER LEFTIST PARTIES REPRESENTED IN THE CABINET THAT TOOK OFFICE ON MAY 11, HAVE, HOWEVER, BEEN PUSHING FOR MORE OPENNESS ON THE PART OF THE GON IN DEFENSE MATTERS AND COULD AFFECT THE CLIMATE OF SECURITY CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE GON.

10. V. RECOMMENDATIONS. (A) WE RECOMMEND THAT AN ON- SITE NDPC SECURITY SURVEY BE CONDUCTED EARLY IN 1974 IN ORDER TO UP- DATE THE FINDINGS OF THE TEAM THAT VISITED THE NETHERLANDS IN 1966, AND TO DETERMINE WHAT-- IF ANY-- EFFECT THE NEW GOVT HAS HAD ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EXISTING SECURITY PROCEDURES; (B) THAT THE ELIGIBILITY LEVELS CONSTAINED IN ANNEX A OF NDP-1/3 BE MAINTAINED; AND (C) THAT THE CURRENT FLOW OF CMI TO THE NETHERLANDS, BOTH IN TERMS OF QUANTITY AND CATEGORY, BE MAINTAINED.
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